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Introduction 
 
 
In this article I examine the historical, political and cultural phenomena related to the 
United States military occupation of Okinawa after World War II. I argue that the US 
authorities encouraged an ‘Orientalist’ discourse about Okinawa in order to justify 
their own position in the islands. This discourse can be found in the post-war mass 
culture products which called for an American intervention in the Ryukyu Islands. In 
order to interpret this discursive process, I have found useful to borrow concepts from 
different theorists. In particular, Edward Said’s work on Orientalism, Michel 
Foucault’s theory on the creation of discourse and Frederic Jameson’s theory on mass 
culture have inspired this essay.   
 
This essay is divided in three sections. First, I set the context for the American 
position in Okinawa in the early 1950s. I argue that the wartime US role and structure 
of governance in Okinawa had to be redefined in order to combine the post-war US 
military objectives in the region and the welfare of the local population. Second, I 
scrutinise the formation of a new historical narrative on Okinawa during the post-war 
years. Indeed, the US authorities developed a new cultural discourse about Okinawa 
which emphasised the uniqueness of the Okinawan people. Here I argue that the 
Americans depicted the Ryukyuans as the ‘Other’, in a fashion that benefited their 
own interests there. This representation was partly based on the stories and travel 
diaries written by sailors and explorers in the nineteenth century, but it was also a  
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a product of the cultural and historical contingencies of the Cold War years. Third, I 
analyse in sociological terms the story of the singular US 1956 film ‘The Teahouse of 
the August Moon’. This story, oriented to an American audience, describes an 
Okinawan village and reproduces the above-mentioned new discourse on Okinawa. I 
argue that this story, as a mass culture product, tells us more about the Americans and 
the American objectives in the region than about the social and political situation in 
post-war Okinawa.  
 
The post-war US military position in Okinawa can shed light on contemporary 
issues and problems in Okinawa. Although the American administration of Okinawa 
ended in 1972, Okinawa has kept its military nature due to the ongoing presence of 
American military and Japanese Self Defence bases. Thus, this essay analyse the early 
stage of a process which has not concluded. 
 
 
Historical Context and Redefinition of the US military role and 
structure of governance in Okinawa 
 
The United States defeated the Japanese forces and attained control of Okinawa 
prefecture in June 1945. In August 1945, Japan surrendered to the allies, and like the 
rest of the country, Okinawa became an ‘occupied enemy territory’ until the treaty of 
San Francisco went into effect in 1952.
7
 The United States government, while 
preparing the end of the occupation in mainland Japan, organised a dual system of 
government in the Ryukyu Islands. On the one hand, the United States Civil 
Administration of the Ryukyu (USCAR), established in 1950, could exercise all the 
rights of sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands. On the other hand, the local 
Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), created in 1952 to ‘further the economic, 
governmental and social well-being of the Ryukyuan people’, could exercise ‘all 
powers of government within the Ryukyu Islands’.8 In sum, the San Francisco system 
gave birth to a new hybrid state.  
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The American position in Okinawa needs to be analysed within the framework 
of the first years of the Cold War. The triumph of the People’s Army in China and the 
outbreak of the Korean War hastened the negotiations between Washington and the 
Japanese government to conclude a peace treaty and bring to an end the post-war 
occupation. The term ‘San Francisco System’ has been used to refer the Japan’s peace 
treaty with other 48 countries and Japan’s alignment with the United States policy. 
From an American point of view, the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
(SFPT) and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1951 legalised — and 
more importantly perpetuated — its hegemonic military position in the Pacific.9  
 
The American retention of the Ryukyu Islands was widely discussed in the 
years prior the SFPT. Okinawa had become a US military hub to support military 
action in East Asia and an important link in the US defence perimeter in the Pacific.
10
 
Thus, the US government considered the long-term retention of the Ryukyu Islands an 
essential element in their strategic plan in East Asia. Consequently, in the SFPT the 
United States claimed the rights of administration over the Ryukyu Islands from 
Japan.
11
  
 
This meant that the United States could use Okinawa’s soil for military 
purposes but also that, at least in the eyes of international public opinion, the 
American government was responsible for the local population. Since US troops were 
no longer an occupation force, and the Okinawans were no longer the enemy, the US 
military´s structure and role (or its discourse) in Okinawa had to be redefined.
12
 In 
terms of the military structure, the chain of command governing Okinawa was 
modified in December 1950 when the United States Civil Administration of the 
Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) was established.
13
 The new structure of governance was 
headed in Tokyo by the Commander in Chief, Far East who became the ‘Governor of 
Okinawa’. Also based in Japan, the Commanding General, Ryukyu Command 
became the ‘Deputy Governor’ (and from 1957 was called ‘High Commissioner’). 
Finally in Okinawa itself, the military structure was completed with the ‘Civil 
Administrator’ who was until 1962 an army active-duty member.14 In sum, due to its 
strategic weight the Ryukyu Islands were kept within the American Far East 
Command and the chain of command was superficially adjusted. As in the novel The 
Leopard we could say: ‘if we want things to stay as they are, things will have to 
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change’; the chain of command was modified to remain the same. The new structural 
element was the creation of an agency (USCAR) to perform the duties of sovereignty 
over the civilians. But ultimately, the island and its inhabitants remained subject to the 
military’s decisions.  
 
 
Orientalism and the construction of a new historical narrative in 
Okinawa 
 
The SFPT made the American government responsible for the local population. It 
should be noted that before and during the war the United States claimed not to seek 
aggrandisement, but nevertheless, it retained possession of the Ryukyu Islands.
15
 In 
the 1950s, terms like ‘The Rock’ to refer to the island of Okinawa, or any detrimental 
expression against the Okinawan people or culture, so common in the early post-war 
years, were no longer valid in the American Okinawa.
16
  Instead, a new historical 
narrative which emphasised the local culture and the US mission in Okinawa was 
developed.  
 
In terms of the local culture, the American authorities used the extensive research 
done by the military occupation experts in the 1940s and sought to encourage the re-
emergence of the native culture and customs. This was an effort to reverse the pre-war 
Japanisation of Okinawa (dejapanisation) and to win the hearts of the local people for 
the occupation. The clearest example of this effort is the change in the name of the 
country from Okinawa, the name used by the Japanese, to Ryukyu which was the 
name that the region had when it was an independent kingdom.
17
 In terms of the US 
mission in Okinawa, the military encouraged a discourse about ‘the other’ (Okinawa 
and the Okinawan people) so that it served their system of interest.
18
 As seen above, 
the American system of interest in the Ryukyu Islands was markedly military and 
aimed to strengthen the islands’ military potential (even to the detriment of its 
people).
19
 Consequently, in order to serve this system of interest as well as to redeem 
their role in the islands, a new discourse of power aimed to unite Americans and 
Ryukyuans in a teleological scheme based on the development of Okinawa.
20
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E.W. Said defined Orientalism as ‘a corporate institution for dealing with the 
Orient- dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, 
describing it, by teaching it(…) in short, Orientalism as a Western style for 
dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’.21  This definition 
evokes the Marxist idea that the production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, 
is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and material intercourse of 
men.
22
 Indeed, Orientalism is ‘a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, 
scholarly, economic, sociological, historical and philological texts; it is an elaboration 
(…) of a whole series of ‘interests’ which, (…) it not only creates but also 
maintains’. 23  In the case of Okinawa, the relationship between Americans and 
Okinawans was a relationship of power and domination, so it is not surprising that an 
Orientalist depiction of the other was elaborated for the administrator’s own interest.24 
Similarly, the dejapanisation of Okinawa and return to the local culture has been 
interpreted as ‘the consciousness of emancipation from discrimination’.25  In other 
words, the new discourse of ‘the other’ emphasised a position of superiority of the 
Americans, giving them a libertarian role, whilst at the same time highlighted the 
native cultural elements.  
 
American perceptions of Okinawa and mass culture: The Teahouse of 
the August Moon 
 
Commodore Perry — the US naval officer who made the first officially-authorised 
visit to Japan in the nineteenth century — had written in 1853 that the people of the 
‘Lew Chew islands’ were ‘industrious and inoffensive, and I have already made 
considerable progress in calming their fears and conciliating their friendly’.26 Before 
Perry, other explorers of the nineteenth century also spread in Europe and the United 
States the idea that the Okinawans were honest, inoffensive, generous and friendly.
27
 
Similarly, in mid-twenty century, we can see the same discourse being continued by 
the Americans who saw the Okinawan people as gentle, easy-going, a bit lazy and a 
bit crafty. This new discourse about the Okinawan had a good reception in the 
American public through different popular-culture productions. For instance, these 
characteristics of Okinawa can be found in the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer production 
‘The Teahouse of the August Moon’ (1956).28 
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This satire, starring Glenn Ford as Captain Fisby and Marlon Brando as Sakini, 
his local subordinate, describes the efforts of a group of American army-men to 
govern Okinawa in the wake of World War Two. In particular, the movie narrates, 
through slapstick comedy episodes, the efforts of Captain Fisby to bring American 
democratic values into the village of Tobiki. He is under the orders of a sturdy and 
stubborn Colonel Purdy who constantly reminds him of his duty of enforcing the 
Manual of Occupation (dubbed ‘Plan B’). However, his translator Sakini, through 
smart manoeuvring, orchestrates the construction of a teahouse instead of the 
officially sanctioned pentagon-shaped school. Finally, in a state of helplessness, Fisby 
accepts the idiosyncrasy of the locals and embraces their customs. In a first reading of 
the film, the locals are represented as smart, friendly, giving and a little lazy. In other 
words, the film repeats a discourse on the Okinawan people which matches with the 
American role of civiliser and democratic force.
29
 
 
 
Note: Poster for the 1953 New York play production. 
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Frederic Jameson argues, in ‘Signature of the Visible’, the proposition that 
‘the only way to think the visual, to get a handle on increasing tendential, all-
pervasive visuality as such, is to grasp its historical coming into being’. 30   This 
proposition is very useful in order to analyse the development of the story. In this case, 
the Teahouse is based on a 1953’s Pulitzer and Tony prize-winning Broadway play 
which is an adaptation by John Patrick of the 1951’s novel written by Vern Sneider.31 
All three versions follow the same basic storyline mentioned above. Consequently, 
the variant against which the film will be read are the novel and play. The novel was 
written during the American occupation of Japan when the new discourse about 
Okinawa was taking shape.
32
 It focuses on the difficulties that Captain Fisby had to 
face when two geisha girls arrive in the village that he commands. Compared to the 
movie, the building of the teahouse itself is less important than the conflict and 
division created by the two female new- comers. The play and movie were made after 
the SFPT and the US long-term administration of the island was a fait accompli. Thus, 
the play and movie focus less on the situation with the geisha (the geisha girls have 
been reduce to only one, Lotus Blossom) and stress the building of the teahouse.  
 
The idea of creating a depiction of Okinawa by borrowing traditional Japanese 
elements (that is, the teahouse and geisha girls) is puzzling, particularly since the US 
government was trying to emphasise Okinawa’s cultural difference with Japan. It 
requires us first to ask who is producing the image and who is the targeted audience. 
Following Said, ‘the Orientalist is outside of the Orient, both as an existential and as a 
moral fact’; and thus, the principal product of this exteriority is representation.33 In 
the Teahouse, the Ryukyu Islands are transformed from a very far distant and even 
threatening ‘Otherness’ into figures that are relatively familiar for the American 
audience (for example, using traditional Japanese symbols). The movie certainly does 
not reproduce a Japanisation of Okinawa in terms of its political construction, but it 
tries to provide an image of Okinawa that is not completely foreign for its audience. 
In this sense, the option for the Japanese elements taken by Sneider and Patrick needs 
to be observed from the idea of culture as a commodity. The film is governed by the 
principle of its realisation as value (for example, how many people see the film), and 
not by its harmonious formation or erudite content.
34
 In sum, the story is an American 
representation of Okinawa. It is oriented to the American public and as such it tells us 
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more about the Americans and the American’s image of Okinawa rather than about 
the Okinawan people. 
 
                          
Note: Above left: 1956 film poster. Note: Above right: Glen Ford as Captain 
Fisby, and Marlon Brando as Sakini in a 
scene from the 1956 film. 
 
Ideology, Utopian reality and Military Government 
 
The population of Tobiki, the town where the Teahouse story takes place, can be read 
as a whole as one character with a polysemous function. This polysemous nature is 
profoundly ideological. The Orientalisation of Tobiki requires both the representation 
of a de-politicised, immoral and backward society, which requires intervention and 
correction; and also, the representation of a utopian reality or transcendental potential. 
It should be noted that in the Teahouse the people of Tobiki are de-politicised and 
disempowered. The film depicts them as having no interest in democratisation beyond 
the committees organised by the US military.  
 
This representation contrasts with the history of resistance and struggle found 
in Okinawan in the 1950s. For instance, in 1956, the year the Teahouse film was 
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released, US congressman Melvin Price visited Okinawa and concluded in his report 
that the land expropriation and lump-sum payment should continue.
35
 The Okinawan 
people reacted and protested against US rule. Political parties, landowners, students, 
workers and school teacher unions opposed the US role in the Ryukyu Islands.
36
 
Indeed, some authors date the beginning of the anti-US movement called Shima 
Gurumi Tōso (島ぐるみ闘争) in 1956.37 In sum, the de-politicisation of the people of 
Tobiki can be read as an attempt to silence the complex political situation in Okinawa. 
The film, by depriving the Okinawa people of a political identity, is creating a 
character who does not question the American presence in the island. In other words, 
the Teahouse empties the people of Tobiki from their political identity, and thus, the 
problematic in the film becomes the dichotomy between West-led development and a 
materially happy existence instead of the negative aspects of the American occupation. 
 
In the novel, the people of the village are depicted as immoral, lazy and 
irresponsible: ‘In the morning when Fisby reached the village, no one was up; so he 
went from house to house, routing out his village officials.’ 38  And later, after a 
meeting with the local officers: ‘Fisby slumped. For a long time after the meeting 
broke up, he sat there. ‘No sense of responsibility,’ he told himself. ‘No sense of 
responsibility whatsoever.’ 39  This point is emphasised in the play and movie, 
particularly through Col. Purdy: ‘No wonder you people were subjugated by the 
Japanese. If you’re not sleeping you’re running away from work (author’s italics). 
Where is your ‘get-up-and-go’.40 Indeed, in the story the US military found in the 
idiosyncrasy of the locals an argument to justify their role as administrators of 
Okinawa, ‘Purdy: teach these natives how to act human!’.41 Outside the realm of 
fiction, this view was also fanned in other spheres. For instance Daniel D. Karasik 
described, in an academic journal in 1948, the Okinawan people ‘who greatly 
resemble the Japanese but do not value exactness, orderliness, and cleanliness to the 
same degree as do the Japanese’.42 Conversely, at the end of the story we learnt that 
the positive elements in the people of Tobiki’s character (hard-workers when they 
have a motivation, generosity, wisdom to appreciate natural beauty, etc.) transformed 
Okinawa into an ideal society. This utopian reality is emphasised by Captain Fisby’s 
personal journey from being exiled in Okinawa to becoming the leader of the most 
prosperous village in the island.  
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It should be noted that in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the US military 
personnel in Okinawa were also depicted negatively, being portrayed as less efficient 
than in other military posts. This image of the US servicemen in Okinawa presumably 
began when General Douglas MacArthur appointed men, whom he did not consider 
good enough to be close to him in Japan, to serve in Okinawa.
43
 The lack of resources 
for the reconstruction of the islands during the 1940s and the initial basic conception 
of the role of the military government, as a means to control disease and population, 
may have impacted on the public’s opinion about the administration of the island.44 
Mass media reports of the situation in Okinawa also contributed to spread this 
negative image of the US servicemen. For example, in 1949 the Time magazine 
pointed out that in Okinawa the ‘more than 15,000 US troops, whose morale and 
discipline have probably been worse than that of any US force in the world, have 
policed 600,000 natives who live in hopeless poverty’.45 Similar articles appeared in 
other prominent US publications such as the New York Times, Christian Century, The 
Progressive, Harper’s Magazine and Life.46  
 
In the Teahouse this negative image of the US troops is highlighted in the 
character of Colonel Purdy, portrayed as a stupid and authoritative man who spends 
his time reading ‘Adventure’ magazine and following his wife’s advice on how to run 
the occupied territory.
47
 Therefore, Fisby’s success in adapting himself to the local 
customs and managing to run Tobiki can be read as the transcendent potential of 
Okinawa. In the novel, more than in the play and the movie, this utopian reality is 
developed. Captain Fisby is describe as a ‘chubby five foot seven’ with one trouser 
leg out of his combat boot and whose ‘perspiration stood out on his forehead’, overall, 
‘it could hardly be said that he cut a military figure’.48 However, whilst in Tobiki, 
Captain Fisby learns that the Plan B and military’s approach to develop the local 
villages are impractical since they do not take into account the locals’ character and 
necessities. Indeed, by the end of the novel Fisby had immerged himself into the local 
culture and learnt to speak the dialect.
49
 In Fisby’s eyes, Okinawa has become a 
utopian reality. He says: ‘I have never been happier. I feel reckless and free. And it all 
happened the moment I decided not to build that damned pentagon-shaped school’; 
his perspective about the Okinawan people has changed completely. ‘FISBY: These 
are wonderful people with a strange sense of beauty. And hard working when there’s 
a purpose. (…) Don’t let anyone tell you these people are lazy’. 50  
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In sum, in the Teahouse the useless captain redeems himself by leading a 
buoyant village’s economy. Captain Fisby’s journey not only emphasises that 
Okinawa really is a land of opportunities, but it also notes the necessity of the 
American aid. The Teahouse, as a mass culture product, remains implicitly negative 
and critical of the social order from which, as product and commodity, it springs.
51
 
The story is critical to the top-down military approach to the occupation, yet, it argues 
for American leadership in a merry but backward society. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the construction of a dual system of government is based on the 
strategic nature of the Ryukyu Islands and on an Orientalist conception of the 
Okinawan people held by the Americans. The USCAR had de facto control of every 
aspect of life in the Ryukyu Islands. Moreover, the GRI’s activities were framed 
within the American regulations. In its foundational document, the GRI remains under 
the authority of the Deputy Governor, who ‘reserves the right, in the event of 
necessity, to veto, prohibit, or suspend the operation of any laws, ordinances or 
regulation enacted by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or any civil government 
or agency of any such government; to order the promulgation of any law, ordinance or 
regulation he may deem advisable; and to resume, in whole or in part, the exercise of 
full authority, in the Ryukyu Islands’.52  The Teahouse describes the post-SFPT’s 
political structure in Okinawa (geopolitical awareness in aesthetics). This description 
emphasises the Orientalist American gaze on Okinawa and supports the occupation. 
However, as a mass culture product, it is critical of the society from where it comes. 
The US authorities, in order to protect their interests, allowed the creation of 
democratic institutions and showed themselves as benefactors. The establishment of 
the USCAR and the GRI is an expression of this tremendously unequal relationship.  
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